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INTRODUCTION
August of 2021 was a month of celebration for anime fans. Loyal
viewers rejoiced at the news that Sony, owner of Funimation Global Group
(Funimation), had reached a deal to acquire Crunchyroll from AT&T for a
staggering $1.175 billion.1 This meant that Funimation exclusive titles would
be merged into Crunchyroll’s already impressive catalogue of shows.
Classics like Yu Yu Hakusho, Cowboy Bebop, and Akira, as well as new age
hits like Horimiya, Kaguya-sama: Love Is War?, and a potpourri of isekai
shows have already made the transition. Equally important is Funimation’s
substantial collection of English dubs.
Sony’s billion-dollar acquisition represents three things. First, “big
anime” is truly here.2 The largest players in entertainment are ready and
willing to sink billions of dollars into Japanese animation, a content medium
that has skyrocketed in popularity in the U.S. since the 90s. This is evidenced
by the investment of major streaming generalists like Netflix, Amazon, and
*

Michael L. Cederblom, J.D., magna cum laude, Brooklyn Law School. I thank Frank Pasquale for
helpful comments on an earlier draft. I also thank my friend Kyle Grichel for helpful discussions
formulating this piece, and my Josephine for her constant support. All views expressed are my own.
1. See Press Release, Sony’s Funimation Global Group Completes Acquisition of Crunchyroll
from
AT&T
(Aug.
9,
2021), https://www.sonypictures.com/corp/press_releases/2021/0809/sonysfunimationglobalgroupcomp
letesacquisitionofcrunchyrollfromatt#:~:text=FOR%20IMMEDIATE%20RELEASE,Sony’s%20Funimation%20Global%20Group%20Completes%20Acquisition%20of%20Crunchyroll%2
0from%20AT%26T,through%20Funimation%20Global%20Group%2C%20LLC.
2. Cecilia D’Anastasio, Welcome to the Era of Big Anime, WIRED (Aug. 31, 2021),
https://www.wired.com/story/funimation-crunchyroll-big-anime-era-is-here/
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Disney into anime streaming. Second, it united what has long been regarded
as the two giants of dedicated anime streaming platforms in the United
States. Now, viewers can log into one platform, pay one fee, and access more
content than ever. Third, it may signal the start of a concerning trend of
consolidation in the anime streaming industry. This should trigger alarm
bells for antitrust authorities. Past lessons suggest that we should be
extremely cautious where conglomerate corporations lead the charge in
industry consolidation.3
This short essay serves as a warning for antitrust authorities: merger
challenges must not be neglected in the anime streaming industry. The
following will discuss the dangers of Sony’s acquisition of Crunchyroll for
the anime streaming market (I), explain why the prevailing model of antitrust
laws is insufficient to stop these harms from occurring (II), and posit that the
antitrust laws give agencies like the FTC sufficient leeway to abandon the
deficient approach of the old guard and take necessary, preemptive action to
protect anime streaming as a unique product market (III).

I. THE ALL FOR ONE OF ANIME STREAMING: CRUNCHYROLLFUNIMATION
Sony and Funimation’s acquisition of Crunchyroll looks like the start
of a dangerous trend of consolidation in anime streaming. Traditional market
principles suggest that the dispersion of power is good—more competitors
create a greater incentive to lower prices to a competitive level or provide
better products through innovation. Both are good for consumers. For
instance, if one large competitor offered a product for above what consumers
are rationally willing to pay, there is ample room for an existing competitor,
or a new entrant, to offer lower prices. Consumers benefit from healthy
competition.
Naturally then, we should worry about industry concentration, which
can signal a lack of competition. Concentrated industries are often
accompanied by higher prices and reduced innovation.4 Paradoxically,
however, our markets are arranged to promote concentration. Scholar and
economist John Kwoka has noted the dangerous trend of concentration in the
U.S. economy allowed by our antitrust laws:
[T]he number of major US airlines has gone from 7 to 4. The number of
accounting companies has fallen from 8 to 4. . . . There are now only two
pharmacy chains, two sizeable mattress manufacturers, two large
brewers. . . . Microsoft has now been joined by four additional dominant
3. See, e.g., Michael L. Cederblom, The Antitrust Alternative: Promoting Public Health Through
Competition, J.L. & SOC. EQUAL. (forthcoming 2023) (describing how concentration in the food industry
has increased food prices and negatively affected public health as a result).
4. John
Kwoka, Squaring
the
Deal, MILKEN
INST.
REV. (Oct.
20,
2017), https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/squaring-the-deal; Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust
Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 721 (2017) (describing how increased market power of firms is often
followed by “diminished innovation”).
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companies, in search, social media, and e-commerce. And these five have
collectively acquired more than 600 companies over the past twenty
years.5

Kwoka has also criticized the poor enforcement efforts of federal
antitrust agencies, linking this to the concentration epidemic. Federal
challenges are generally confined to mergers leading to extreme
concentration (two to three competitors), ones bordering on true monopoly.6
Despite the lack of federal challenges, however, mergers reducing the market
to five to eight competitors are largely anticompetitive still.7
There are two important lessons that can be gleaned from Kwoka’s
findings. First, concentration is harming consumers. Airlines, for instance,
are offering fewer and lower quality flights.8 Workers’ wages are stagnating
across the board.9 It has even been pointed out how concentration contributes
to increasing food prices.10 With fewer competitors and lax agency
enforcement, large conglomerate corporations have been able to siphon
greater profits at the expense of the consumer.11 Second, Kwoka’s data
details a troubling trend: emboldened by weak antitrust principles,
companies have been able to purchase their way out of competition just until
the point where the FTC or DOJ might step in and challenge them—a
monopoly creep of sorts. The FTC and DOJ’s categorization of startup
acquisitions as procompetitive (or not anti-competitive), as seen in Kwoka’s
review of big tech companies like Microsoft and Amazon, precludes an
outcome where a nascent competitor can arise. But these still pose “no
threat” to competition under prevailing principles since startups will not
bequeath upon the purchaser sufficient market power to trigger monopolistic
concerns in existing markets, and the short-term focus of existing review
precludes a finding of anticompetitive capabilities in future markets.
Enter the Crunchyroll-Funimation merger. Sony’s acquisition of
Crunchyroll was designed to combat the rising market shares of competitors
like Netflix and Amazon Prime Video.12 The immediate result was a
decreased incentive to innovate. For example, Funimation’s website has long
5. Does America Have a Monopoly Problem? Examining Concentration and Competition in the
U.S. Economy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Antitrust, Competition Pol’y & Consumer Rts., S.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 (Mar. 5, 2019) (prepared statement of John E. Kwoka, Jr., Neal
F.
Finnegan
Distinguished
Professor
of
Economics,
Northeastern
University),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kwoka%20Testimony.pdf.
6. Id. at 6.
7. Id.
8. See Frank Pasquale & Michael L. Cederblom, The New Antitrust: Realizing the Promise of Law
& Political Economy (working paper) (on file with author).
9. Id. at 51.
10. See Cederblom, supra note 3.
11. Id. (discussing Tyson’s behavior during the pandemic, raising prices to counter the supposed
costs of the pandemic and supply chain shortages, while also recording increased profits).
12. Josh Sisco & Jessica Toonkel, Sony’s Hopes of Countering Netflix in Anime Market Delayed by
Antitrust Probe, INFO. (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/sonys-hopes-ofcountering-netflix-in-anime-market-delayed-by-antitrust-probe.
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received strong criticism for its lack of functionality compared to the simpler
design of Crunchyroll. But now, Funimation no longer needs to fix or
improve their website; they can just use the new one they bought from
Crunchyroll.
Prior to the merger, concentration was already having its effect. For
thirteen years, Crunchyroll maintained their original pricing model of $6.95
for a premium subscription. After their acquisition by AT&T, Crunchyroll
raised their prices for the first time ever to $7.99, a 15% increase.13 Perhaps
they were emboldened by a market mainly consisting of only seven
streaming services (Crunchyroll, Funimation, Netflix, Amazon Prime Video,
HBO Max, Hulu, and HiDive). What is more concerning is what the merger
allows Crunchyroll-Funimation to do going forward.
Consider now Crunchyroll’s free subscription model. Previously,
viewers were able to choose between the $6.95 per month fee and a free adsupported membership model. These members were able to watch all
existing and new shows as they aired (called “simulcast” in the industry—
where anime debuting in Japan is simultaneously broadcasted to American
audiences on a regular basis instead of all episodes being released as a
complete season) for free. The only tradeoffs were free viewers received ads,
and simulcast shows were released one week later for free members than
premium members (who had access to simulcast shows the day after the
Japan release date).14 After their acquisition by Sony, CrunchyrollFunimation changed this policy and removed the free, ad-supported model
for new shows. Now, anyone who wants to watch the newest shows as they
air must pay the increased price of $7.99 per month—note the loss of
incentive to offer the ad-supported free model. Previously, viewers likely
chose between Funimation and Crunchyroll (or one of many piracy sites) to
watch the newest simulcast shows. Crunchyroll enticed viewers to their
platform through their free membership built on ad revenue. Without
Funimation as a competitor, however, Crunchyroll-Funimation just lost their
incentive to maintain their ad-free model.
Also highly concerning is the potential for greater labor exploitation.
Partly to blame is Sony’s successful efforts at vertical integration.15 Look at
13. Anthony Ha, Crunchyroll Raises its Monthly Subscription Price to $7.99, TECH CRUNCH (Mar.
22, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/22/crunchyroll-raises-its-monthly-subscription-price-to-799/#:~:text=Prices%20for%20its%20premium%20subscription,or%20%C2%A364.99%20per%20year.
14. Emma Roth, Crunchyroll Ends Free Streaming for New and Continuing Series, VERGE (Mar.
27,
2022), https://www.theverge.com/2022/3/27/22998591/crunchyroll-ends-free-ad-supportedstreaming-new-releases-simulcastsanime#:~:text=Crunchyroll%20will%20no%20longer%20offer,which%20start%20at%20%247.99%20
%2F%20month.
15. Vertical integration has long been lauded by Establishment antitrust scholars as procompetitive,
unlike its horizontal counterpart. However, modern scholars point out the anticompetitive tendencies of
such coordination that is relied upon and currently being challenged by the Big Tech industry. See
Marshall
Steinbaum
(@Econ_Marshall),
TWITTER
(Sept.
6,
2022,
8:18
AM),
https://twitter.com/Econ_Marshall/status/1567125127338524673. Vertical restraints, according to
Steinbaum, have been embraced by the law: “And his aim has been achieved in the de facto legalization
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the anime Fate/Grand Order: the show was produced by Aniplex (owned by
Sony), animated by Clover Works (owned by Aniplex), dubbed by
Funimation (Sony), and the music was largely produced by Sony Music.16
Later, Funimation acquired a 30-day exclusivity period internationally and a
1-year exclusivity period for the English dub.17 By inserting themselves at
each step, Sony leverages their influence to gain even more streaming and
exclusive licenses. This is the type of foreclosure that Lina Khan warned
about in 2017 that has been largely ignored since it falls outside the purview
of the “Consumer Welfare” standard’s concern of price and output.18
There are two consequences of this: (1) lower wages for Japanese
animators, and (2) lower wages for U.S. English dub voice actors. Animators
in Japan are notoriously underpaid, earning roughly $2 an hour for their hand
drawn work.19 A concentrated streaming industry will ensure fewer
distribution outlets, forcing animation companies to accept lower prices,
reducing pay. Coupled with the rising demand overseas, Japanese actors will
be overworked and underpaid. English voice actors are also frighteningly
underpaid. Often working for Funimation or Crunchyroll, actors risk the
integrity of their vocal cords while earning as little as $35 an hour without

of vertical restraints, most recently in Ohio v. American Express.”). Marshall Steinbaum, When It Comes
to the History of Economics, Don’t Think Like an Economist, L. POL. ECON. PROJECT (Sept. 6, 2022),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/when-it-comes-to-the-history-of-economics-dont-think-like-an-economist/.
One consequence of this vertical integration is unprecedented control of workers and a near complete
avoidance of the consequences of labor law. See, e.g., Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, The Gig Economy,
and Labor Market Power, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 53 (2019) (“More recently… is the advent of
the so-called gig economy: the deployment of independent contractor status for workers, not just for the
independent businesses who employ them. This makes each individual worker an independent business,
and thus denuded of any protections under labor law. However, they can simultaneously be controlled
entirely by employer/customers without the protections and stability of the employment relationship
enshrined in statute during the New Deal. This is the business model that online labor platforms like Uber,
Lyft, Handy, and Care.com have perfected…”). Despite the present-day acceptance of vertical restraints,
they were once illegal under the Sherman Act. Premised on political concern over bigness, enforcers were
highly concerned with the potential for “leverage and foreclosure” of these vertical giants. See Lina M.
Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 731-32 (2017). This is the type of danger that
Sony’s vertical integration poses in the anime streaming market. Sony’s influence at all stages of the
stream of production for anime streaming requires competitors like HiDive to compete not only for
licenses, but for music, production, and more. Id. at 732 (“Foreclosure, meanwhile, occurs when a firm
uses one line of business to disadvantage rivals in another line. A flourmill that also owned a bakery could
hike prices or degrade quality when selling to rival bakers—or refuse to do business with them entirely.
In this view, even if an integrated firm did not directly resort to exclusionary tactics, the arrangement
would still increase barriers to entry by requiring would-be entrants compete at two levels.”).
16. D.M. Moore, Anime is One of the Biggest Fronts in the Streaming Wars, VERGE (Dec. 23, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/12/23/21003549/anime-streaming-wars-netflix-amazon-att-sonycrunchyroll-funimation.
17. Id.
18. Khan, supra note 16, at 732.
19. Eric Margolis, The Dark Side of Japan’s Anime Industry, VOX (July 2, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/culture/2019/7/2/20677237/anime-industry-japan-artists-pay-labor-abuse-neongenesis-evangelion-netflix.
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session minimums.20 Earning $35 an hour may seem like a great rate, but it
rarely results in a substantial paycheck. The voice actors for Jujutsu Kaisen
0, one of the biggest anime movie hits of 2022, are estimated to have earned
only $150-600 for the entire movie.21
This is just the beginning and prompt action is needed. In industries like
big tech, the harms flowing from overly concentrated markets are difficult to
unwind. It is significantly easier to prevent the harm of concentration by
targeting mergers initially. For instance, it would be easier to stop
Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram than to untangle the two after nearly 10
years of integration. Fortunately, the FTC is beginning to prioritize blocking
incipient concentration in new and emerging markets.22 For Chair Lina Khan,
the FTC must turn its attention forward to the “next-generation” of big tech.
For instance, the FTC recently filed a challenge against Meta’s acquisition
of Within (a “reality fitness start-up”) to protect the viability of the future
market.23
The next generation of entertainment is already here. Anime is a rapidly
growing industry that demands forward thinking enforcement.24 The same
approach the FTC is applying to big tech should be used in the anime
streaming market, for proactive, not reactive, policies will keep a market
competitive. Instead of shelving acquisitions by large conglomerates in the
anime streaming industry as procompetitive or simply not anticompetitive,
like the FTC has historically done with Big Tech and startups, the federal
agencies should give great weight to the implications that such mergers will
have on future competitive markets. Viewing such acquisitions by vertically
integrated companies like Sony with a more critical eye, focusing on the
potential for leveraging and foreclosure, will better protect markets down the
road from terminal consolidation. After all, the history of antitrust
enforcement under the prevailing Establishment principles has endorsed
concentration and, as will be discussed, is incapable of preventing it, even
under the leadership of a reformist like Khan.

II. ESTABLISHMENT ANTITRUST’S MYOPIA
Khan’s forward-looking enforcement is necessary for young and
growing markets because the principles of the prevailing Establishment
20. Borealis Capps, Crunchyroll’s Low Pay Sparks Controversy Among Voice
Actors, GAMERANT (Mar. 4, 2022), https://gamerant.com/crunchyrolls-low-pay-sparks-controversyamong-voice-actors/.
21. Evan Minto, The Battle for Union Anime Dubs, ANIMENEWSNETWORK (Mar. 28,
2022), https://www.animenewsnetwork.com/feature/2022-03-28/the-battle-for-union-animedubs/.183842.
22. See Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Chair Upends Antitrust Standards with Meta Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES (July
28,
2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/28/technology/ftc-lina-khanmeta.html?searchResultPosition=2.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Sara Fischer & Kerry Flynn, Demand for Anime Content Soars, AXIOS (Jan. 11, 2022),
https://www.axios.com/2022/01/11/anime-demand-soars-content-straming.
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Antitrust25 prevent meaningful intervention. In fact, their methods have
directly resulted in the current concentration epidemic. There are two reasons
for this. First, the deficient Consumer Welfare (CW) standard endorses
concentration based on its narrow economic output focus. Second,
Establishment principles tend to rely on broad product market definitions,
ones favorable to would-be-monopolizers that preclude successful
enforcement under the CW standard.
The antitrust laws were designed to protect competition, not some
notion of neutral empiricism. From their founding, and for much of the
history of their enforcement, the antitrust laws promoted populist political
values (small business and democracy).26 However, Robert Bork’s highly
influential book, The Antitrust Paradox, rerouted the entirety of antitrust.
Bork posited that antitrust enforcement had lost control, and the true purpose
of the antitrust laws was quite simple: promoting lower prices and increased
output. Bork’s “Consumer Welfare standard”27 quickly gripped the federal
agencies and courts, establishing itself as the prevailing school of thought.
Now, neither bigness nor concentration is seen as an issue in the analysis.
For Bork and his following, they lacked sufficient empiricism. Instead, so
long as short-term price does not increase, or output decrease, there is no
violation of the antitrust laws.28 If lower prices can be achieved by the work
of a single dominant firm, the CW standard would welcome it. Even if prices
increase, if there is some tangible procompetitive justification, the behavior
may be excused under the assumption that there is a net positive result.
In the anime streaming market, we should expect nothing different.
Based on these myopic output concerns, there is nothing conceivably wrong
with mergers like Crunchyroll-Funimation’s. Nothing in the short-term
suggests the streaming giant will raise prices or decrease output. Even the
changes to the free membership model can be excused by a procompetitive
justification such as the additional shows added to the library—the price
increase is warranted. The issue here is that such a model ignores the
increased power and ability of the giant to raise prices in the future when the
market is sufficiently concentrated.
Broad market definitions also lend to favorable review under the CW
standard. In a broad market, we can seemingly find more competitors and a
lower percentage of market share, lowering the perceived risk of a proposed
merger. Part of the reason for this preference is an unwillingness to use
narrower market definitions for fear of stifling innovation. This fear is not
completely unfounded, since market definitions are often outcome

25. “Establishment Antitrust” is a term coined by Frank Pasquale and I describing the modern
lineage of the Chicago School antitrust scholars. See Pasquale & Cederblom, supra note 8.
26. See, Cederblom, supra note 4, at 14.
27. Thomas A. Piraino Jr., Reconciling the Harvard and Chicago Schools: A New Antitrust
Approach for the 21st Century, 82 IND. L.J. 345, 350 (2007).
28. See, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[R]eduction
of competition does not invoke the Sherman Act until it harms consumer welfare.”).
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determinative.29 On this view, authorities have come to the conclusion that
product market definitions are being too narrowly defined such that
important economic efficiencies are being excluded from the analysis.30
While narrow market definitions are ostensibly pro-plaintiff, broad ones are
notably pro-defendant. Even if markets are being more narrowly defined
today than 20 or 30 years ago,31 this does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that markets are too narrowly defined—perhaps we are just
closing in on what is a more accurate product market definition. However,
this fear of stifling innovation through overenforcement in emerging markets
precludes meaningful review.32
This is the approach that AT&T and Sony took for the CrunchyrollFunimation merger. Arguing that the “anime market” is not a distinct market,
they sought to broaden the scope of the analysis to include other animated
shows like The Simpsons and Family Guy, creating an appearance of
heightened competition in the now broader market. A continuation of these
policies would ensure that industry-narrowing mergers like this will
continue. Sony, Amazon, and Netflix are poised to continue to buy
competitors like HiDive without repercussion under the guise that other
competitors in the expanded market provide viable competition. The result
will be concentration and consumer harm, like we have seen time and time
again.

III. TOWARDS FAIR COMPETITION
Khan’s leadership foreshadows a New Antitrust agenda that accounts
for the deficiencies of the Establishment Antitrust.33 Fortunately, the
flexibility of the antitrust laws as written provides ample space for this shift.
The CW standard was not written into the antitrust statutes, rather it is the
product of generalist courts coopting the rightful role of agency experts and
imposing particular normative values.34 As Sanjukta Paul has pointed out,
we are free to reconstruct these guiding principles of antitrust under different
normative values.35 And we should. The emphasis should be on promoting

29. Christine S. Wilson, The Unintended Consequences of Narrower Product Markets and the
Overly Leveraged Nature of Philadelphia National Bank, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 30, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1532894/wilson__remarks_at_oxford_antitrust_enforcement_symposium_6-30-19_0.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Christine S. Wilson & Keith Klovers, Same Rule, Different Result: How the Narrowing of
Product Markets Has Altered Substantive Antitrust Rules, 84 ANTITRUST L.J. 55, 59 (2021).
32. See, e.g., Andrew C. Hruska, A Broad Market Approach to Antitrust Product Market Definition
in Innovative Industries, 102 YALE L.J. 305, 305 (1992).
33. For a discussion on the “New Antitrust” movement, see Pasquale & Cederblom, supra note 8.
34. Id. at 30-39; Ganesh Sitaraman, Taking Antitrust Away from the Courts, THE GREAT
DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE, 1, 6-7 (2018).
35. Sanjukta Paul, Recovering the Moral Economy Foundations of the Sherman Act, 131 YALE L.J.
176, 179 (2021).
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fair competition—a fitting job for the FTC which is explicitly empowered to
implement “morality embedded in Sherman Act case law.”36
Part of the restructuring should emphasize narrow market definitions
that more accurately capture the relevant market. Thus, anime streaming
should be viewed as a distinct market, separate from entertainment and other
types of animation. Anime has created a unique (formerly niche) audience.
Naturally, The Simpsons is not an adequate replacement when one finishes
Bleach or Tokyo Ghoul.37 The presence of these shows on a general
streaming platform does not negate this, and the presence of anime-only
streaming platforms actually supports the idea of anime as a distinct market.
Conflating anime and anime streaming with animation generally or even
with the entirety of the entertainment market may include some market
efficiencies as desired by the Establishment antitrust, but it also works to
mask anticompetitive tendencies and mergers that cancel out and overpower
any proposed efficiency.
Antitrust also structures markets. Instead of promoting maximumefficiency giants, we can promote fair competition. What constitutes “fair
competition” is perhaps not exactly clear cut, but what we know is that it is
broader than the type of conduct proscribed by the Sherman and Clayton
Acts.38 For instance, Sandeep Vaheesan has called for the FTC to define
“market dominance” at 30% or more control of a market,39 a much more
generous (and realistic) interpretation of where a corporation can engage in
anticompetitive practices. To Vaheesan, such a rule would promote fair
competition by “strik[ing] at monopolies in their ‘incipiency,’”40 instead of
trying to remedy preventable harms. The FTC’s goal should be to flush out
the concept of fair competition, likely by looking to the failures of the
policies of the last 40 years.
Imperative to assuring fair competition for future markets is proactive
enforcement to protect young, growing markets from early domination.
Khan has set the new status quo (by returning to the original goals of the
antitrust laws) with its Within merger challenge.41 Applying this to the anime
36. Sandeep Vaheesan, The Morality of Monopolization Law, 63 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. ONLINE
119, 123 (2022).
37. One reason for this difference is the larger range of mature themes found in anime. Cartoons are
colloquially thought of as shows for kids. While adult humor and content is often strewn throughout (such
as the White Bronco reference in Shrek 2), the primary audience is still children, and the content is
appropriate. Anime, on the other hand, purposefully makes shows for adults. One would not mistake the
brutality of Berserk, Parasyte, or Re:Zero, for instance, to be suitable for young children like The
Simpsons or SpongeBob would. There appears to be a more fundamental difference between the two
categories as well, revealed by AI and neural networks. See Chai Jia Xun, Haritha Ramesh, & Justin
Yeo, Are
Anime Cartoons?, http://cs229.stanford.edu/proj2016/report/ChaiRameshYeoAreAnimeCartoons-report.pdf (“This tells us that there are significant differentiating features between
anime and cartoon – features that can even be detected by a machine.”).
38. Vaheesan, supra note 36, at 134.
39. Id. at 136-37.
40. Id.
41. Khan, supra note 19.
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streaming market would require the FTC and DOJ to challenge similar
mergers in the future that threaten to consolidate the industry. This is the goal
of antitrust, after all, to arrange the economy and markets in such a way to
assure fair competition for both viewers and labor—this requires (as
originally intended) the promotion of small business and the reigning in of
large corporations that seek to corner the market by reducing the number of
competitors.42 While the courts have bought in to the Establishment
economic narrative, agencies like the FTC were not designed to be
subservient to the generalist judicial system. Armed with expertise and
industry specific knowledge, agencies should take control of antitrust review
back from the generalist courts with the power specifically delegated to them
by Congress.43 Sandeep Vaheesan has argued that this legislative power is
quite broad:
Under progressive leadership, one federal agency, the FTC, could
resurrect antitrust law as “a comprehensive charter of economic liberty.”
Modern administrative law and Congressional delegation of policymaking
authority grant the FTC expansive power to interpret the antitrust
provision of Section 5 of the FTC Act. In enacting this statute, Congress
articulated a grand progressive-populist vision of antitrust. It wanted the
FTC to police “unfair methods of competition” that injure consumers,
prevent rivals from competing on the merits, and allow large corporations
to dominate our political system. Congress intended the FTC’s antitrust
authority to encompass more than the prohibitions in the Sherman and
Clayton Acts and to nip anticompetitive problems in the embryonic state
before corporations gained undue power over consumers, small suppliers,
competitors, and the American political system.44

Building on Vaheesan’s work, in The Antitrust Alternative, I argued that
§5 gives the FTC the power to define unfair acts in ways that protects the
food market from unfair mergers that harm competition.45 The same
approach to protecting markets should be taken here: under §5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, the FTC can use its administrative rulemaking
power to provide merger review parameters that includes scrutiny of the
future leveraging and foreclosure capabilities a merger may confer on an
entity (instead of focusing merely on short term price and output), with the
42. Letter from FARM ACTION, Re: Request for Information on Merger Enforcement (Apr. 21,
2022), https://farmaction.us/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Farm-Action-Merger-Guidelines-Comment4.21.22.pdf.
43. See Cederblom, supra note 4, at 23.
44. Sandeep Vaheesan, Resurrecting “A Comprehensive Charter of Economic Liberty”: The Latent
Power of the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 645, 650 (2017). Discussing the concern
of big businesses crossing market boundaries, using their monopolies to enter and become top competitors
in new markets (through conglomerate mergers), Peter C. Carstensen and Nina H. Questal advocated for
the FTC to use §5 to create a rule defining certain conglomerate mergers as “unfair” under the FTCA,
perhaps based on size. See Peter C. Carstensen & Nina H. Questal, Use of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act to Attack Large Conglomerate Mergers, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 866-68 (1978).
45. Id. at 23-24.
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goal of protecting future markets from “unfair acts.”46 Taking advantage of
the rightful deference that should be afforded to such expert agencies, the
FTC can redefine the structures of competition law to promote fair
competition in present and future markets.

CONCLUSION
As the anime streaming industry rushes towards its bright future,
antitrust authorities must be vigilant. Fortunately, we are in a unique position
compared to other concentrated markets—anime streaming is still young in
the U.S., and it is possible to act before it is too late. The New Antitrust
reformists of the Biden administration are grappling with the difficult
problem of unwinding decades of concentration in big tech. The same
mistake cannot be made here; antitrust agencies and lawmakers must not
ignore this rapidly growing arena. It is imperative that federal agencies
redraw their approach to align with the normative foundations of antitrust:
the protection of fair competition and the dispersal of power. Narrowly
defining the anime streaming market and proactive enforcement will prevent
underenforcement-led monopoly creep through terminal consolidation of the
industry, and allow anime streaming to flourish in the coming years.

46. Id.
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